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Abstract. Group behavior is an important feature of conflict scenarios. Often 
such groups are chaotically organized, but their ideals are sociologically em-
bedded across members such that the group has expected behavior that can rep-
resent a major threat. Therefore being able to model the evolution of groups on 
a generative basis, to anticipate their possible mutation, is valuable. However 
this is complex due to the diverse nature of human behavior and scenarios. In 
this paper we present an innovative approach to modeling these issues. Group 
identities are represented in terms of the behaviors (social norms) that members 
are expected to carry out towards other groups. Individuals predominantly com-
pose their identity from the identity of the groups to which they belong, which 
is known to occur in situations of heightened conflict. The model introduced 
enables exploration of tensions associated with affiliation to multiple groups 
and the influence on inclusion and exclusion of individuals.  
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1 Introduction 
Understanding group behavior is highly valuable in situations of conflict and political 
instability. Over the years numerous significant theoretical insights have been made 
[1,2,3], but particularly profound contributions have originated from Social Identity 
Theory [4]. A person’s social identity is broadly a perception of who they are [5], and 
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in situations of heightened tension, the identity provided by a membership of a partic-
ular group can take precedence over the individual’s sense of self (i.e., ones identity 
in the absence of any group). As a consequence of a heightened sense of belonging to 
a group, an individual naturally become disposed to adopting the beliefs and behav-
ioral expectations, or social norms, of the group. Recent contributions have sought to 
develop this direction further, with Identity Fusion Theory [6] addressing the interplay 
between group and individual identities.  
From these and other works, social identity has established itself as an important 
concept through which we can better understand human groups. In this paper, we use 
Social Identity Theory to develop a new and generative model of group behavior, 
specifically focusing on the tensions associated with affiliation to multiple groups. 
Our approach explores the natural pressures that exist between groups and the influ-
ence on inclusion and exclusion of individuals. We emphasize that our model does not 
seek to predict human behavior, but it exposes the potential tensions upon individuals 
when groups have conflicting expectations of the behavior of their members. This 
allows us to explore how group members become forced to migrate between groups, 
or become embedded within the social norms of a group. The use of simulation in this 
manner has become an important tool for identifying latent forces that shape behavior 
(e.g., [7]).  
Our contribution also adds to the state-of-the-art in generative modeling of group 
behavior [8,9] by providing a simple but effective event driven approach. The state-
of-the-art in this area is at a formative stage, with numerous interesting approaches 
now emerging (e.g., [10]). The key distinctive feature of our model is the assumed 
prevalence of groups and their influence on the individual:  specifically each individ-
ual is represented as a combination of the identities of the groups to which they be-
long. This is motivated by Social Identity Theory and contrasts with a conventional 
modeling approach where individuals are the dominant modeling element, from 
which groups are then defined based on a collection of common characteristics.  
A further advantage of our approach is that it provides a flexible framework for 
controlling and extending the number of parameters in the model, which enhances 
prospects for useful experimentation. This is an important element in generative mod-
eling for social computation, particularly from the user’s perspective, as it reduces the 
extent of a-priori learning required to understand parameter sensitivity and parameter 
interaction. This supports the exploration of groups, including the prospects for intel-
ligent forecasting of changes to their size and individual affiliations.  
2 Model 
The model we adopt has simple underlying principles. A population of individuals 
and a set of groups represent the main components. Individuals, or agents, are affiliat-
ed with multiple groups, dividing their commitment (i.e., time and resources) across 
their group affiliations. This is modeled by each individual having a weighting vector 
(w1, w2, . . . wn) where wi indicates the proportion of the agent’s commitment to group 
Gi ( 𝑤! = 1!!!! ). The weighting vector signals the groups to which an individual is 
affiliated and for demonstration purposes we use a population of 100 agents and four 
groups.  Individuals are randomly assigned to groups at the beginning of the simula-
tion.  In all experiments, G0 initially has 73 members, G1 and G2 have 78, and G3 has 
76 members. 
2.1 Representing group 
Each group has an identity that is described by the degree to which its members 
should perform different actions towards the other groups. Table 1 shows the five 
types of action that have been chosen for demonstration purposes. Each action is de-
scribed by a cost to the individual and an impact (positive or negative) on the receiv-
ing group. This framework allows extreme as well as mainstream out-group behavior 
to be modeled. Table 2 shows how we represent a group’s expected norms, defining 
the expected frequency of different actions, which we call a social norm vector. A 
group may apply different expectations of behavior to different groups: Table 3 
demonstrates this using our four example groups.  
2.2 Representing the individual  
Although individuals act on behalf of the groups that they are affiliated with, we also 
make provision for individuals to possess their own individual identity. This is a so-
cial norm vector (Table 2) that they will choose to identify with in the absence of 
affiliation with any group. We assume the individual social norm as the mainstream 
behaviour SN1 for 75% of the population, SN2 for 20, and SN3 for the remaining 5%. 
We also invoke an individual compliance parameter for each agent j, denoted compj, 
which governs the chance that j complies with a group’s norm, rather than its own 
norm, when conducting an action on behalf of a group (Section 2.3). This is set as 
95% chance for all individuals. 
2.3 Individuals perform actions on behalf of a group towards other groups  
The simulation applies a sequence of 100 rounds, after which an evolutionary step is 
applied (Sections 2.4, 2.5), creating the next generation and after which a new se-
quence of rounds occurs. For this demonstration, 100 generations are performed and 
individuals have 100 units of resource available for performing actions at the start of 
each generation. 
In each round, each individual j randomly selects a group to act for, from the 
groups to which j belongs (determined as i for which wi is > 0), and performs an ac-
tion towards another group if their current associated resources is equal or greater to 
the chosen action’s cost. The group that j chooses to act for, say G, is randomly cho-
sen but weighted by j’s weighting vector. At the same time, a target out-group, say 
G*, is randomly selected for the action, where G and G* are distinct. Note that j may 
also be a member of G*. If j is not a member of any group (due to previous exclusion) 
they are considered independent and can continue to act, and effectively constitute 
their own group.    
The action that j undertakes is defined by the social norms of G in respect of G* 
and by the individual’s compliance parameter compj (Section 2.2). For example, using 
Table 3, if G = G1, and G* = G0, then j selects an action on a random basis weighted 
by the social norm vector SN2, as defined in Table 2, which overall represents nega-
tive behavior. Whether the individual performs the action is determined randomly 
using compj, in which there is a 1- compj (5%) chance than an individual reverts to a 
action with the probability of selection weighted by its own norm (Section 2.2). If a 
user is not affiliated with a group then the action towards G* is chosen from the indi-
viduals own norm. 
When an action is performed, j uses their associated resources defined in Table 1. 
At the same time the cumulative impact on group G* is recorded, as defined by the 
schedule in Table 1.  For demonstration purposes we perform 100 rounds before evo-
lution is applied (Sections 2.4 and 2.5). 
2.4 Evolution and exclusion from a group  
After the sequence of 100 rounds has been completed (Section 2.3), an evolutionary 
step is performed. This step looks at the overall actions that individuals have per-
formed against the expectations of the groups to which they are affiliated, and consid-
ers whether they are candidates to be excluded. This is carried out using processes 
under two themes: (i) the tolerance that a group applies with respect to impact on the 
group by its own members while they are acting on behalf of other groups; (ii) the 
normativity of group, representing the strictness with which group members should 
perform actions on other groups consistent with expected social norms.  
The tolerance and normativity are attributes that characterize the nature of a group, 
alongside the group’s social norm vectors. For example, extreme groups would be 
expected to exhibit high levels of normativity, while liberal groups would be the op-
posite. Additionally, defining tolerance and normativity allows us to characterize 
groups based on their in-group/out-group disposition, since tolerance is focused on in-
group expectations while the normativity is focused on out-group expectations. Our 
definition of normativity is inspired by its sociological definition [11], representing 
the extent to which members should feel that they ought to behave in a particular way.  
For exclusion based on intolerance, assuming that j is a member of G, if the cumu-
lative negative impact that j has performed towards G within a generation is beyond 
the value of ex-tolG then j is flagged for removal from G. This can occur if j acts nega-
tively towards G when representing another group. The value of ex-tolG for all groups 
G is defined in Table 4. 
For exclusion based on deviation from normativity, each group G considers the 
percentage of positive impact verses negative impact that each individual makes to-
wards all other groups after 100 rounds. This is compared with their own social norms 
towards other groups. The exclusion strictness, ex-strictG, is the parameter used to 
determine how much an individual can deviate from G’s expectations of out-group 
behavior. If an individual deviates in their out-group behavior towards all groups and 
is a member of the G, they will be flagged for exclusion.  
Using G0 as an example, the expected impact of the social norm applied by G0 to-
ward other groups is calculated and used for comparison with group member j. We 
use G0 as defined in Table 3, where G0 is an extreme group applying SN3 (Table 2) to 
all other groups. Starting with G1, only 1% of actions from G0 are expected to be posi-
tive leading to an expected positive impact of just 0.1 units. 40% of expected actions 
are negative and 10% of expected actions are strongly negative, resulting in an ex-
pected negative contribution of -54 units. This means that 0.18% of total impact on G1 
is expected to be positive and 99.82% of impact is expected to be negative.  
These values are similarly computed in respect of G2 and G3, and compared to the 
negative/positive impact made by j towards G1, G2, and G3 during the previous 100 
rounds. If at least one of these are within ex-strictG1 percent of the expected posi-
tive/negative impact on each group (i.e., 0.18% and 99.82% respectively for this ex-
ample) then j remains in G0, otherwise j is flagged for exclusion from G0. This process 
is then repeated for G1, G2, and G3. 
After considering all individuals in the population, those that are flagged to be ex-
cluded from each of the groups are removed by setting their commitment weighting 
(w) to zero for the these groups. For such individuals, we re-normalize the non-zero 
elements of the weighting vector (w1, w2, . . . wn) to ensure that 𝑤! = 1!!!!  once 
again. This represents the agent increasing their commitment to the groups that they 
remain affiliated with, while preserving the ratio of time spent between them.  
2.5  Evolution and admission to a group  
The concepts of tolerance and normativity can also be used to model admission to a 
group, analogous to the processes for exclusion. We use the threshold, denoted in-tolG, 
to govern the admission of j to a group G (shown in Table 4). The individual j must 
have made a positive impact to G, which is at least in-tolG in magnitude, over the 
previous 100 rounds. A threshold in-strictG is used to govern admission based on nor-
mativity (shown in Table 4), adopting a process that works analogous to that for ex-
clusion based on normativity; with the exception that for an individual to be flagged 
for inclusion into a given group G, their impact towards all other groups must be with-
in in-strictG percent. 
Using these processes individuals are flagged for potential inclusion to particular 
groups, joining with a weight w of 0.1. Additionally, there is a small chance that an 
individual will join a group with a weight of 0.1 through mutation, set at a probability 
pjoin of 0.01 for testing purposes for all groups. Mutation represents serendipity and 
random changes in behavior or scenarios.  For each individual j, to accommodate the 
commitment to new groups, we renormalize the existing group weights, while pre-
serving the ratio of time spent between pre-existing group affiliations, to ensure that 𝑤! = 1!!!! . 
2.6 Presentation of the Model 
Example pseudo-code summarising the evolutionary steps. 
program Group evolution (Output) 
  begin 
    Set individual agent parameters; 
  Set group parameters; 
 Set affiliation of individuals to groups; 
 Generation=0;  
    repeat 
  Initialize agent resources; 
  Set to zero the received impact on groups; 
  for i = 1 to num_rounds 
    for j = 1 to num_agents 
j chooses group to act for, if they are af-
filiated with at least one (Section 2.3) 
j chooses group G to act upon (Section 2.3) 
action performed (Section 2.3) 
cost to j and impact on G recorded 
  // perform evolution 
  exclude individuals from groups (Section 2.4) 
  include individuals in new groups (Section 2.5) 
  Generation++; 
  until Generation = Max_generations 
end. 
Above we summarize the overall pseudo-code that represents the simulation frame-
work. Monitoring the weighting vectors throughout the simulation allows group size 
and shape to be assessed. We set Max_generations to be 100, num_rounds to be 100, 
num_agents to be 100, and resources to be 100.  
3 Scenarios 
We adopt a scenario of four groups as described in Tables 3 and 4, which documents 
how each of the four groups expect their members to behave towards other groups, 
and how tolerable they are to in-group impact and strict towards out-group impact. 
The social norm vectors defined in Table 2 determine these behaviors. In turn, the 
social norm vectors are specified by the actions in Table 1. In the scenario, G0 is an 
extremist group that is strongly negative to all other groups, while the others (i.e., G1, 
G2, G3) are negative towards G0, but not extreme, and positive towards each other.  
We note that the format of input in Tables 1, 2 and 3 means that interesting and 
complex scenarios can be defined and examined. The range of action types (Table 1) 
is extensible and can be specified to include a wide range of potential actions that are 
specific to a particular group or scenario.   
Table 1.  Specification of actions that individuals may perform in terms of cost to the individu-
al and impact on the receiving group.  
Action Type Description Cost to individual Impact on the receiving group 
1 Strong positive action 100 500 
2 Positive action 5 10 
3 Indifferent action 1 0 
4 Negative action 5 -10 
5 Strong negative action 100 -500 
Table 2.  Social norm vectors used in the scenarios by groups and individuals, describing the 
mean frequency of actions types.  
Social 
norm   
vector  
Description Action 
 type 1  
(Strong +ve) 
Action  
type 2  
(+ve) 
Action  
type 3  
(Neutral) 
Action 
type 4  
(-ve) 
Action  
type 5  
(Strong –ve) 
SN1 Mainstream  5% 60% 34% 0.9% 0.1% 
SN2 Negative 0% 10% 75% 14.9% 0.1% 
SN3 Extremist 0% 1% 49% 40% 10% 
Table 3.  Scenario specification: three groups are mostly mainstream (G1, G2, G3), and one is 
extremist (G0).  
 Social Norm Vector applied to group: 
Group G0 G1 G2 G3 
G0  SN3 SN3 SN3 
G1 SN2  SN1 SN1 
G2 SN2 SN1  SN1 
G3 SN2 SN1 SN1  
Table 4.  Scenario specification: normativity (i.e., strictness) and tolerance for the four groups. 
Group in-strictG ex-strictG in-tolG ex-tolG 
G0 .1 .1 50 -50 
G1 .5 .5  50 -50 
G2 .5 .5 50 -50 
G3 .5 .5 50 -50 
 
4 Results 
In this section we present proof of concept results that show how different assump-
tions affect the size of groups over time, and effects on multi-group affliation.  
4.1 Applying tolerance but not normativity allows extremist groups to 
dominate    
We begin by exploring how in-group tension can form. Fig 1 shows the sizes of the 
four groups after each generation when tolerance (ex-tolG and in-tolG, in Section 2.4 
and 2.5 respectively) is the only measure used for inclusion and exclusion. Normativi-
ty criteria are not applied. In Fig 1 and similar plots the y axis is cumulative.  
The results (Fig 1 and 2) show G0 continuing to grow over time with the other 
groups shrinking. This occurs due to the heightened positivity in the social norms for 
G1, G2, and G3, in comparison to G0. Individuals perform generally positive actions 
towards G0 when representing G1, G2, and G3, presenting no barrier to inclusion to G0. 
As the same time, individuals acting on behalf of G0 perform negative actions towards 
the other groups, resulting in an increased chance of exclusion from G1, G2, and G3.  
  
 














Fig. 2. Cross-group membership after generation 100 when only in-group tension is considered 
using ex-tolG and in-tolG. Nodes are scaled proportionally to the group they represent. Edges 
represent the size of the intersection in membership between two groups. 
Additionally since exclusion mechanisms are only based on the negative impacts 
received, extremist groups tend not to expel members that may be acting according to 
the social norms of mainstream groups. Members of G0 are not invited into main-
stream groups as they very infrequently perform any positive actions.  
This is evident in Fig 2, which shows the majority of members of G0 cutting ties 
with the other groups by the time of generation 100, except for a small percentage, 
who are sustained through a the combined effects of mutation (i.e., random incidenc-
es) and use of individual identity and their own social norm (5% chance).   
4.2 Tolerance and normativity lead to group stability, and suppress 
dominance of the extremist group   
In contrast to Fig 1, Fig 2 displays the results when both tolerance (ex-tolG and in-
tolG) and normativity (ex-strictG and in-strictG, in Section 2.4 and 2.5 respectively) are 
applied in the inclusion and exclusion processes. The results show that considering 
how members act towards other groups impedes G0 from growing. All groups co-exist 
over time with relative stability, which is without any one single group dominating. 
 
 
Fig. 3. Changes in group size based on groups only using tolerance and normativity 
 
 
Fig. 4. Cross-group membership after generation 100 when both tolerance (ex-strictG and in-
strictG) and normativity (ex-strictG and in-strictG) are considered. Nodes are groups sized pro-
portionally with the number of members and edges represent the size of the intersection in 
membership between two groups. 
 
The greater number of mainstream groups means that there is a greater chance of 
individuals acting towards G0’s out-groups in a manner that it deems incompatible to 
expectations. This reaffirms the presence of the groups G1, G2, and G3. It also indi-
cates that the number of groups, as well as their size, impacts on the dynamics and 
this is worthy of further investigation.  
This is also reflected through individuals in G0 cutting ties with other groups, with 
Fig 4 showing all members of G0 cutting ties by generation 100 (a small number occa-
sionally re-appear for a short period through the subsequent generations, due to muta-
tion). In contrast, members of the mainstream groups are more capable of maintaining 
strong ties among each other and this reaches a 100% level of shared membership 
after a relative short number of generations. 
It is also worth commenting that during the course of this investigation, we exper-
imented with the extent of the strictness parameter for normativity, particularly for G0. 
Under definition of the parameter, increasing the parameter increases leniency, poten-
tially increasing the pool of individuals that can be admitted to G0. We find that due to 
the extreme social norms of G0, high levels of leniency (e.g., >.98) are required to 
substantially increase the size of G0. This destabilizes the scenario allowing G0 to  
 
Fig. 5. Changes in group size based on groups only using tolerance and normativity  
 
dominate. This also reflects the potentially crude nature of the judgment process used 
to model normativity. 
 
In Fig 5 we show the number of inclusions and exclusions that occur over course of 
the simulation. The results show high levels of changes to initial membership, which 
is due to the random allocation of group membership at the beginning. However, after 
around 10 generations this reduces and any events predominantly due to mutation or 
the resulting change in behavior due to mutation (discussed in Section 2.5). This sup-
ports the findings in Fig 4: under these conditions the population quickly divides be-
tween positive and negative norms. 
 
A final observation is that some individuals occasionally get excluded from all 
groups and become independent. However, this is unsurprisingly short-lived (as 
shown in Fig 3), because when this happens individuals revert to their own social 
norms, which for this scenario, align closely with those used in at least one group. 
4.3 Prohibiting re-admission to groups after exclusion marginally affects 
mainstream groups more than the extremist group  
Fig 6 shows the effect of prohibiting re-admission to each group after their first ex-
clusion. Once individuals become affiliated in the extremist group, their affiliation 
with other (mainstream) groups is severed (Fig 4). This is occurs as a consequence of 
the mainstream groups executing exclusion. As extremist group members are more 
likely to be isolated to that group, there is much less a likelihood of them acting on 
behalf of other groups in an incompatible way.  
As a result we observe that the extremist group G0 tends to remain relatively static 
in size while the mainstream groups tend to marginally decline in membership (Fig 6). 





Fig. 6. Group size over 500 generations when re-admission to groups is prohibited.  
5 Conclusions 
The results demonstrate a first proof of concept for a model concerning the tensions 
on individuals that belong to multiple groups where expectations on behavior differ. 
This is a new approach to modeling groups that allows us to assess the changes in a 
group’s size as a consequence of behavioral social norms of groups and the affiliation 
of individuals between them. The model represents a group’s identity behavioral ex-
pectations (social norms), which can also be included for individuals.   
The model allows observation of the natural tensions that exist between belonging 
to multiple groups when their social norms differ. Consequently we can use the model 
to gain insight into the features that influence the evolution of particular types of 
groups, such as those with extremist tendencies.  
From testing, the initial results exemplify conditions that affect the stability and 
growth of groups. In particular, the judgment processes that groups apply for inclu-
sion and exclusion have a significant effect. Extreme groups prosper, in terms of re-
cruitment, when they are in-group focused, making judgments only based on the ex-
tent of negative actions done towards them by individuals. As soon as extreme groups 
judge potential members based on their actions towards the out-groups, this restricts 
admission and their subsequent growth, unless there is extreme leniency. This reaf-
firms that recruitment strategies for extreme groups may masquerade in mainstream 
forms to gain traction.  
The results also show that individuals can successfully coexist in mainstream 
groups while membership of an extremist group requires that individuals sever their 
affiliations with other groups. Numbers of groups and their relative similarity also 
appear to influence potential growth of groups, and this warrants further exploration.  
5.1 Future Work  
In summary, the model represents an interesting framework for considering group 
dynamics based on the natural tensions that exist between behavioural expectations. It 
can be extended and refined in a number of directions to include group-based scenari-
os for wide ranging situations, and with additional levels of detail. This development 
can also include modeling interventions and assessing their effects, with calibration of 
parameters based on real world scenarios. Further contextual factors, individual dif-
ferences and group effects can potentially be included. These will support future gen-
erative modeling capability, which is currently at a formative stage.  
6 Acknowledgement 
This research was sponsored by the U.S. Army Research Laboratory and the U.K. 
Ministry of Defence under Agreement Number W911NF-16-3-0001. The views and 
conclusions contained in this document are those of the authors and should not be 
interpreted as representing the official policies, either expressed or implied, of  the  
U.S. Army  Research  Laboratory,  the  U.S.  Government, the U.K. Ministry of De-
fence or the U.K. Government. The U.S. and U.K. Governments are authorized to 
reproduce and distribute reprints for Government purposes notwithstanding any copy-
right notation hereon. 
References 
1.  Pettigrew TF, Tropp LR. A meta-analytic test of intergroup contact theory. J. Personality 
and Social Psychology, 90(5):751 (2006) 
2. Allport GW. The nature of prejudice. Basic books (1979) 
3. Fiske ST. What we know now about bias and intergroup conflict, the problem of the centu-
ry. Current Directions in Psychological Science. 1;11(4):123--8 (2002) 
4.  Tajfel H, Turner JC. An integrative theory of intergroup conflict. The social psychology of 
intergroup relations, 33(47):74 (1979) 
5. Hogg MA. Social identity theory. In: Understanding Peace and Conflict Through Social 
Identity Theory pp. 3-17. Springer International Publishing (2016) 
6. Swann Jr WB, Gómez Á, Seyle DC, Morales J, Huici C. Identity fusion: the interplay of 
personal and social identities in extreme group behavior. J. Personality and Social Psycholo-
gy. 96(5):995 (2009) 
7.  Whitaker RM, Colombo GB, Allen SM, Dunbar RI. A dominant social comparison heuristic 
unites alternative mechanisms for the evolution of indirect reciprocity. Scientific Reports 6 
(2016) 
8.  Whitaker RM, Felmlee D, Verma DC, Preece, A, Williams G. From evolution to revolution: 
understanding mutability in large and disruptive human groups. In SPIE Defense and Securi-
ty, to appear (2017)   
9.  Verma DC, Verma Felmlee D, A, Pearson G, Whitaker RM. A generative model for predict-
ing terrorist incidents. In SPIE Defense and Security, to appear (2017)   
10. Naugle AB, Bernard ML. Using Computational Modeling to Examine Shifts Towards Ex-
tremist Behaviors in European Diaspora Communities. In: Advances in Cross-Cultural Deci-
sion Making, pp. 321-332. Springer International Publishing (2017) 
11.Anderson E. Beyond homo economicus: New developments in theories of social norms. 
Philosophy & Public Affairs. 1;29(2):170-200 (2000) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
